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Customs officials conducting border searches have always been ex-
empt from the usual fourth amendment requirement that searches be
based on probable cause. Although the courts have experienced diffi-
culty in determining when searches not undertaken at the border it-
self should qualify as border searches, they have universally assumed
that the reasonableness and constitutionality of such searches never
depend upon the existence of probable cause. Unfortunately, none of
the arguments advanced justifies this treatment of border searches.
Although several factors may differentiate border from normal
searches, they do not warrant exempting all border searches from the
requirement of probable cause. Sound, intelligent border search deci-
sions require consideration of the extent to which a border crossing
raises the probability that evidence will be obtained or justifies a re-
laxation of the traditional requirement of probable cause for a search
within the country. Since the Supreme Court has already recognized
the principles that would be relevant for such an analysis, border
searches can and should be integrated into normal fourth amendment
law.
I. The Border Search Exemption
Since the first border search statute was enacted in 1789,1 customs
officials have been authorized to stop and examine any vehicle, person,
or baggage arriving in the United States on suspicion that merchandise
is concealed which is subject to duty or which cannot legally be im-
ported into the United States.2 Similar legislation empowers customs
officers to search any vehicle or vessel anywhere in the United States
1. Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) provides:
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search,
and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast,
or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which
is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in or upon
such vehicle or beast, or otherwise....
Under 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964):
The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations for the search of per-rons
and baggage and he is authorized to employ female inspectors for the examination
and search of persons of their own sex; and all persons coming into the United
States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized
officers or agents of the Government under such regulations.
See 19 C .F,. § 23.1(d) (1967).
1007
The Yale Law Journal
for contraband,3 and immigration officials are authorized to conduct
searches for illegally entered aliens within a reasonable distance from
the border (currently defined as 100 miles) without probable cause.4
The constitutionality of such provisions has never been questioned by
the courts. Regardless of their intrusiveness, all searches designated
"border searches" have automatically been exempt from requirements
of probable cause.
Recent circuit court cases involving intrusive or body cavity
searches and searches far removed from the border have confirmed
and perhaps even broadened this border search exception. Although
the courts have obviously been troubled by the notable absence of any
satisfying rationale for the exception, they have attempted to obscure
these difficulties by reasoning that such searches are adequately con-
trolled by the general fourth amendment requirement of "reasonable-
ness." Unfortunately, however, the courts have failed to delineate the
determinants of reasonableness by standards which reflect the need
for and dangers of border searches.
Thus, in Rivas v. United States5 and Henderson v. United Stateso
the Ninth Circuit attempted unsuccessfully to respond to the appel-
lants' contention that Schmerber v. California7 should be applied to
intrusive searches of the person at the border. In Schmerber the Su-
preme Court had held that even where probable cause for an arrest for
drunken driving existed, an intrusive search incident to the arrest-
blood testing, there-was lawful only if there was a "clear indication"
that relevant evidence would be found. Although the opinion seems
to suggest that such a "clear indication" is an additional requirement
to be piled atop the need for probable cause for arrest before "the in-
terests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1964) provides:
(a) Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle
at any place in the United States ... or at any other authorized place, without as
well as within his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and
papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof
and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
4. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1964):
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under Regulations prescribed
by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant-
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,
to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United
States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle....
"Reasonable distance" is defined by 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1967) as 100 air miles from any
external boundary, or any shorter distance fixed by the district director.
5. 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
6. - F.2d -, 1 Cmm. L. REP,. 2275 (9th Cir. 1967).
7. 386 U.S. 757 (1966).
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protects"" can be overriden by an intrusive search, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Schmerber could be reconciled with its exemption of
intrusive border searches from the requirement of probable cause. Ig-
noring the relationship in Schmerber of the "dear indication" test to
the requirement for probable cause for arrest, the circuit court as-
serted that such an indication was required under the rubric of rea-
sonableness that it had previously applied in intrusive border search
cases.9 While the appellant apparently offered Schmerber as part of a
frontal attack on the border search exception, the court chose simply
to engraft that decision onto the traditional exception. Thus, the
court seems to have assumed that a crossing of the border served as a
triggering event for application of a "clear indication" test in the
same way that an arrest upon probable cause triggered the test in
Schmerber. Since there was no underlying finding of any probable
cause in the border search context, however, the court by "applying"
Schmerber simply placed a putatively libertarian gloss on the border
search doctrine while changing its substance little if at all.10
The courts' recent attempts to delineate the characteristics of ex-
tended border searches have been no more satisfactory. According to
the Ninth Circuit in Alexander v. United Statesn whether a search
not undertaken at the border is exempt from the probable cause re-
quirement as an "extended border search" depends on
whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including
the time and distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of
surveillance, are such as to convince the fact finder of a reasonable
certainty that any contraband which might be found in or on the
8. Id. at 769-70.
9. Rivas v. United States, 268 F.2d at 710-12.
10. The "dear indication" test is stated in Rivas as follows:
An honest "plain indication" that a search involving an intrusion beyond the
body's surface is justified cannot rest on the mere chance that desired evidence may
be obtained. Thus we need not hold the search of any body cavity is justified merely
because it is a border search, and nothing more. There must e.dst facts creating a
clear indication, or plain suggestion of the smuggling. Nor need these facts reach the
dignity of nor be the equivalent of "probable cause" necessary for an arrest and -earch
at a place other than the border.
568 F.2d at 710 (emphasis added).
Compare this formulation with that in Schmerber, 384 US. at 769-70.
The Rivas rule is not appreciably different from the pre-Schmerber caues in the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits which approve intrusive personal searches at the border so long as
they are "reasonable." Blefare v. United States, 362 F-9d 870 (9th Cir. 1966); Lane v.
United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 381 US. 920 (1965); Barrera v.
United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958). See Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-
The Border Search, 21 RuTrERs L. Rm. 513 (1967); Comment, rntrusive Border Searches-
Is Judicial Control Desirable? 115 U. PA. L. REV. 276 (1966).
11. 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
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vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the time of
entry into the jurisdiction of the United States.12
The rationale for this test is that "the primordial purpose of a search
by Customs officers is not to apprehend persons, but to seize contra-
band property unlawfully imported . . . ."13 If that were in fact the
purpose, the time and place of the search would be immaterial pro-
vided that the government proved that the contraband seized had in
fact crossed the border, as the test requires. But that is not in practice
the purpose of such extended searches. The appellants in both Alexan-
der and Rodriguez-Gonzales v. United States,4 another recent case
with analogous facts, had not crossed the border with the contraband;
but by delaying the search of the car involved in each case, the govern-
ment managed to sweep them in along with the contraband. Iad the
government wanted only to seize the contraband, there is no reason
suggested in either case why it could not have done so at the border.
The use of the fact that the car had crossed the border as a continuing
excuse for a search thus allowed the government to invade the per-
sonal privacy of the appellants without probable cause. And since they
had not crossed the border with the contraband, the test advanced by
the court is illogical when advanced to justify not the seizure of the
contraband but rather its use as evidence against the appellants.15
12. Id. at 382.
13. Id.
14. 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
15. Searches of border crossers in the immediate vicinity of the border have uni-
versally been affirmed as border searches. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.
1967); Valadez v. United States, 358 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966); Taylor v. United States,
352 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1965); Mansfield v. United States, 808 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962),
Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960).
Searches farther removed from the border have also been sustained as border searcheg.
These searches are typically preceded by siryeillance, and the searches were not con.
ducted at the authorized border station either because the suspect had not been ldcntficd
until after he had cleared customs or because the authorities hoped to apprehend his
accomplices inside this country. Morales y. United States, 878 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967);
Lannon v. United States, 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967); Rodriguez-Gonzales v. United States,
378 F.2d g56 (9th Cir. 1967); Alexander v, United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th cir, 1966);
Rodriguez v. United States, 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir, 1961), aflg, 195 F, Supp. $13 (S.D, Tex,
1960).
A related set of cases deals with immigration officers (usually doubling as customs
officers) who, in stopping vehicles within 100 Tpiles of the border to search for illegal
aliens pursuant to 8 U.S.C, § 1357 (1964) uncover narcotics. Those searchcs which
uncover narcotics incidentally during proper questioning about citizenship arc affirmed
on the theory that the pfficer who spots narcotics while performing his other duties
need not blind himself to the crime being committed in his presence. Blut thte ir.
migration officers may not conduct a search aimed at revealing narcotics without probable
cause. Renteria-Medina v. United States, 346 F.2d 853 (9th ir. 1965): Fernandez v.
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Contreras v. United States, 291 Fg2d 63 (9th
Cir. 1961) (illegal search); United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Calif. 1959)
(illegal search); Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th dir, 1957),
In some sense Alexander actually expands the power of cuqtoms official4 to conduct
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II. The Alleged Justifications for the Border Search Exception
A. The Argument From History
The original customs statute exempting border searches from prob-
able cause requirements was passed by the First Congress, which also
proposed the Bill of Rights.' 0 It has often been argued that this fact
demonstrates the validity of the present border search exemption. 7
However, this fact is not dispositive for three reasons, First, the legis-
lators may have passed the customs statute of 1789 without considering
fully the applicability to border searches of the moral position to
which they were about to commit the community in drafting the
fourth amendment. Second, the community's standards of reasonable-
ness may have changed over time. And third, changes in the underly-
ing facts may have made unreasonable a search which would have been
reasonable by the same standards in 1789.
The Supreme Court has already recognized the nonconclusiveness
of the argument from history in fourth amendment cases as in other
areas. In Camara v. Municipal Court' the Court ignored the argu-
ment from history on which it had itself relied eight years before in
Frank v. Maryland.9 In overruling Frank by forbidding punishment
of individuals for refusing to admit warrantless housing inspectors,
the Court undermined the argument frequently advanced for refusing
on historical grounds to inquire into the justification for the border
search exception.
B. Policy Interests at the Border
It has also been argued that the border search exception is justified
by the vital national interest in preventing illegal entry and smug-
gling, particularly of narcotics. 20 Although special conditions prevail-
extended border searches. Prior Ninth Circuit cases which rejected the gocrmnent's
theory of an extended border search seem to turn on the lack of surveillance from the
time of the border crossing. Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1951); Plaola
v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961). Alexander's emphasis on surveillance seems
consistent with these cases. However, although the Fifth Circuit has always granted
customs officers great latitude in conducting extended border searches, it has recognized
that there is some geographical point, however vaguely defined, beyond which "normal"
probable cause takes over and the extraordinary border search power ceaes. See Thomas
v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum), citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 US. 132 (1924).
16. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789). See Barnett, A Report on Search and
Seizure at the Border, Am. Camt. L.Q. Aug. 1963, at 36 (customs problems).
17. 13oyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
18. 887 U.S. 523 (1967); see See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
19. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
20. While smuggling has always been a problem at the border, it has become more
acute since the enactment of the federal prohibitions on the importation of narcotics and
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ing at the border are unquestionably relevant for determining what
kinds of searches are reasonable, such special factors do not by them-
selves justify the current border search exception. The Supreme Court
recognized in Ker v. California21 that special problems of enforcement
should be given weight in determining the reasonableness of a search,
but such considerations do not justify a blanket exemption from prob-
able cause requirements that fails to weigh the competing interests
that the fourth amendment protects.
22
III. An Alternative to the Border Search Exception
A. Weights in the Balance
The fourth amendment was designed to balance the state's interests
in enforcing its laws against the individual's interest in his dignity and
privacy. Although for various reasons almost all border searches do af-
fect these interests in a peculiar fashion, several types of border
searches can be clearly differentiated.
As a class, border searches can be distinguished from normal
searches of individuals pursuant to criminal investigations on three
grounds. First, since an individual crossing a border belongs to a class
whose members frequently violate certain laws in the process of enter-
ing, the fact of his crossing is by itself some evidence that he may be
violating some law. Second, since the individual crossing a border is
on notice that certain types of searches are likely to be made, his pri-
vacy is arguably less invaded by those searches. Third, since non-intru-
sive personal searches at the border are administered to a class (inter-
national travelers) which is not deemed unworthy, such searches lack
the quality of insult felt by an individual singled out for a search.
Clearly, however, not all border searches are homogeneous in these
marijuana. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1964) (narcotics) and 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964)
(marijuana).
Narcotics are easily obtainable in Mexico, and the Mexican.American border is the
scene of a large volume of illicit trade in narcotics. Mexico is convenient to large numbers
of American addicts and pushers, and the incentive for them to smuggle is evidently
sufficient for them to be willing to risk customs inspections at the border. Because of
their small size, narcotics are uniquely suited to concealment in body cavities, and this
practice is common at the border. In Blackford the Federal Government asserted that
between 18 and 20 per cent of the international narcotics traffic in that area is conducted
by smuggling the drugs in body cavities. 247 F.2d at 752. The court in Rivas also noted
the practice. 368 F.2d at 709.
21. 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963).
22. Camara is relevant in this regard. In that case, while the Supreme Court recognized
the importance of the administrative search in the maintenance of minimal standards of
housing and health, nevertheless, these factors did not bar the Court from requiring a
warrant procedure in order to give due weight to the rights of privacy and freedom
from unreasonable search. 387 U.S. at 535-39.
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respects. Thus, although individuals are likely to expect non-intrusive
searches of their baggage and perhaps their outer clothing at the bor-
der, they will not be prepared for intrusive personal searches or ex-
tended border searches. Since such searches also tend to separate the
parties searched from the morally neutral class of international travel-
ers, they will be more insulting as well as more invasive of privacy. In-
trusive personal searches are particularly suspect in this regard: in ad-
dition to singling out and surprising the person, such searches by their
very nature insult and affront the dignity of any member of our
society.
The connection between border crossings and the probability that
an offense is being committed also depends on the type of search un-
dertaken. Although a substantial percentage of border crossers may
conceal illicit or dutiable merchandise in their baggage, vehicles, or
clothing, a much smaller proportion hides such materials in their
body cavities. Indeed, unless there is a tip from an informer, evidence
of current or recent drug use, or perhaps a criminal record of smug-
gling or addiction, there is almost no reason to suspect that an indi-
vidual crossing the border is concealing materials in this manner.
In short, although there is justification for treating border searches
as a special class, such searches differ significantly among themselves.
Such distinctions must be recognized if border searches are to be regu-
lated in an intelligent manner. Although the fourth amendment does
not itself distinguish among types of searches, the Supreme Court has
recognized almost all the relevant distinctions in its recent fourth
amendment opinions. Thus, in Camara the Court (1) decided that
membership in a suspect class may contribute to probable cause; (2)
concluded that because searches of morally neutral classes are less in-
sulting to the individual searched, such searches may be undertaken
with a lower probability that they will reveal relevant evidence; and
(3) in guaranteeing the individual the right to a warrant recognized
(though perhaps insufficiently) the protection that notice affords die
individual's right to privacy.23 In Schmerber- 4 (and potentially in the
stop and frisk cases),25 the Court concluded that the intrusiveness of a
23. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). But in Camara, unlike the border search, it should be noted
that the search was itself morally neutral and was not aimed at revealing criminal
violations.
24. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25. See, e.g., People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (186).
prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 980 (1967). The New York Court of Appeals majority ex-
pressed the idea behind the New York "stop and frisk" law, N.Y. CoDE CRIM. P. § 180-a
(McKinney Supp. 1967):
The attempt to apply a single standard of probable cause to all interferences-iae.,
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search bears on its reasonableness. And in Ker2Q the majority opinion
acknowledged that state authorities may properly take their special
enforcement problems into consideration in evolving reasonable stan-
dards for searches and seizures. Thus, by applying Camara, Schmerbcr,
and Ker, the courts could articulate standards distinguishing the spe-
cial features of the several varieties of border searches without depart-
ing from normal fourth amendment principles.
B. Some Applications
As we have seen, several special features should affect the courts'
evaluation of normal or extended searches; (1) the government's in-
terest in preventing the entrance of illegal aliens and merchandise; (2)
the importance of the illicit international narcotics trade; (3) the prob-
ability of smuggling attempts at the border; (4) the difficulty of detect-
ing narcotics smuggling; (5) the effect of notice on the extent to which
the individual's privacy is invaded; (6) the fact that individuals
searched because of their membership in a morally neutral class have
less cause to feel insulted; and (7) the peculiar offensiveness of intru-
sive personal searches.
Four types of searches will be examined in light of these factors: (1)
examination of identification papers; (2) searches of baggage, vehicle,
and clothing; (3) intrusive personal searches; and (4) extended border
searches,
1. Examination of Identification Papers
X attempts to cross from Mexico into California, A customs agent
asks to examine his identification papers and proof of American citi-
zenship. This is not an unreasonable search because the very fact that
X is coming from a foreign country puts his identification and citizen-
ship at issue, At this level, X's interests in privacy are minimal-the
examination is routine, expected, and noninsulting, Hence, the bor-
der crossing itself makes it reasonable to question X about his citizen-
ship.27
to treat a stop as an arrest and a frisk as a search-produces a standard either so
strict that reasonable and necessary police work becomes unlawful or so dluted
that the individual is not adequately protected. The varying standards now In
effect . . best r-sp1ve this problem.
18 N.Y.2d at 247, 219 N.E.2d at 600, g73 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
Prior to § 180-a, New York courts developed judicially a similar set of distinctions, See,
e.g., People v. Rivers, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert, denied,
379 U.S, 978 (1965), California courts have developed a similar approach. See, e.g., People
v. Dumas, 251 A.C.A. 699, 59 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1967).
26. 374 U.S. 23, 8334 (1963).
27. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 866 U.S. 950 (1901),
offers this argumezl p a rationale for all border searches:
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2. Searches of Baggage, Vehicle, and Clothing
The customs officer then asks X if he has anything to declare. On
X's negative reply, the officer proceeds to examine closely X's baggage,
automobile and outer clothing, including pockets. Clearly, these ac-
tions constitute a search, and X's interests in privacy have been in-
vaded even if the search is conducted in a reasonable manner with
only minimal disarrangement of X's possessions. Yet, since X is on no-
tice that such a search may be undertaken, this invasion of his privacy
may be less serious. Moreover, since X is being searched as a result of
his membership in a morally neutral class, the investigation should
not be considered insulting. On the other hand, the state's interest in
searching people like X is substantial. No alternative enforcement
methods are available and X does belong to a group whose members
frequently do violate the laws. Such searches should therefore be up-
held. It would probably be preferable to rationalize this species of
search in terms of its reasonableness, although it might also be possible
to articulate the standard applied by reference to a sort of group prob-
able cause analogous to the concept of area probable cause created in
Camara.
28
3. Intrusive Personal Searches
In both the above situations, the individual interests at stake were
sufficiently small to justify relaxing normal probable cause require-
ments. Such a result is not warranted where intrusive personal searches
are concerned. Intrusive personal searches are no less offensive at the
border. Such searches are unusual, and the border crosser has no rea-
son to expect such an intense examination of his person. The fact that
such searches occur at the border does not affect their inherent ten-
No question of whether there is probable cause for a search exists wihen the search
is incidental to the crossing of an international border, for there is reason and
probable cause to search every person entering the United States from a foreign
country, by reason of such entry alone.
But carrying the presumption to include all border searches is of doubtful validity since
most border crossers do not violate the law. The later Ninth Circuit cases (e.g., Rkas and
Henderson) do not claim that the fact of crossing the border provides probable cause but
that it makes probable cause unnecessary.
28. The argument for retaining a limited border search exception for lower levels of
search confined to authorized border stations and for not employing the group probable
cause approach suggested by Camara is that Camara dealt with administrative -earches
for housing code violations which, unlike the border search, seldom involve criminal
sanctions. To accept the Camara approach for even such a limited area as low-level
border searches may have an undesirable impact on our requirement of particularized
probable cause for searches involving criminal sanctions. It would probably be wser to
accept frankly the necessity of a limited border search exception than to open up probable
cause to further dilutions in other areas of criminal law where the probability is high
that offenders will be found in a given group.
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dency to degrade. And no less than elsewhere, an intrusive search even
at the border insults the victim by singling him out for special treat-
ment as a morally suspect person. Accordingly, intrusive border
searches should not be exempt from normal requirements of probable
cause. Indeed, as Schmerber suggests, although in a different context,
intrusive personal searches may well require more than probable
cause. In short, although the fact that X is crossing the border may
contribute to a probability that he is hiding illicit matter in his body
cavities, that fact alone neither amounts to probable cause nor justifies
a relaxation of that standard.
To begin to sort out the additional facts that might justify a finding
of probable cause, several more hypothetical situations are needed.
(a) Assume that X has identified himself and that the results of a
search of baggage, vehicle, and clothing were negative. Would the
customs officer be justified in demanding that X strip down for a body
inspection without having any other information? The function of the
body search is to reveal special kinds of contraband that are small
and easily concealed on the body-e.g., narcotics or gem stones. The
probability that a particular individual is attempting to smuggle such
items is certainly far lower than that normally required for a finding
of probable cause. Such a search should therefore not be permitted,
as it is now under the misconceived "clear indication" test presently
employed by the Ninth Circuit.
(b) Assume the same set of facts, except that the search of X's lug-
gage revealed some item which is subject to duty. While X's attempt to
evade the customs laws shows some propensity to violate the law, the
attempt alone does not justify the conclusion that he is likely to
attempt to import contraband of the kind concealed on the body. An
intrusive personal search for narcotics or gem stones is still unreason-
able on these facts alone; there is not probable cause to believe that
the search will reveal illicit materials.
(c) Assume the same set of facts, except that the search of baggage
did reveal narcotics. X is subject to arrest, since possession or importa-
tion of narcotics is an offense.29 Since narcotics are preeminently the
sort of contraband concealed in body cavities, an incidental body
search might then be justified. One relevant factor would be the
amount of narcotics discovered in the person's vehicle or baggage. If a
large shipment has been discovered, it is unlikely that the person has
gone to the trouble to conceal a small additional amount in a body
29. See note 20 supra.
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cavity. If, on the other hand, only a scattered trace of narcotics is dis-
covered in, say, baggage, this might indicate that the principal ship-
ment was removed and is hidden in or on his body.
(d) Assume the same set of facts, except that the baggage search re-
vealed a "narcotics kit" without narcotics, or that X is observed by a
qualified expert to be under the influence of narcotics, or that X is
seen to have fresh needle marks on his arms, characteristically caused
by injections of narcotics. These facts, the border situation, and the
availability of narcotics in Mexico would seem to create the requisite
probable cause for a body search.
(e) Assume that X has registered at the border as a narcotics addict
or violator.30 While Beck v. Ohio31 holds that past conviction for a
crime does not by itself allow a finding of probable cause, such infor-
mation may properly be taken into account.
(f Assume that X has never been convicted of a narcotics offense
and has not registered as an addict, and that the baggage search re-
vealed nothing incriminating. But also assume that X has been named
by an informant as having narcotics in his possession. If the informant
has been "reliable" in the past, if X has been specifically named, and
the tip includes some of the underlying circumstances (e.g., the reli-
able informant saw X make narcotics purchase in Mexico and gives de-
tails of the transaction), this fact coupled with the crossing of a border
where narcotics smuggling is common could amount to probable cause
for the body search.32 If X has not been specifically named, but only
described, X might still be searched where the available information
(e.g., license number, detailed physical description, expected time and
place and time of border crossing) is sufficient to identify X as the per-
son described by the tip.
Where the informant cannot be shown to have been "reliable," his
tip should be radically downgraded as a factor contributing to prob-
able cause. Inside the country, the word of an unaccredited informant,
unsupported by other information, would not justify a search; border
crossers are not sufficiently suspect to justify different treatment.33
30. An addict or convicted offender is required to register at the border on entering
and leaving the United States under 18 U.SC. § 1407 (1964).
31. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
32. See id.; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959.
33. The other border factors deemed important still hold in this situation, so a tip
from an unaccredited informer arguably should not alwa)s be disregarded. It depends
on the nature of the tip, its specificity, the reasons the officers may have to believe it,
short of accreditation and corroborative or suspicious behavior at the border. To say that
an unaccredited tip should always be disregarded is to discount the importance of the
special circumstances prevailing at the border, which Congress certainly has not done,
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4. E tended Border Searches
X has cleared customs and has entered the United States, At this
point the normal requirements of probable cause should be enforced
for a search of his vehicle unless the government can show an adequate
reason for not conducting the search at the border, X will no longer
be prepared for a search and a search will no longer seem directed to
him as a member of the morally neutral group of border crossers. His
interests will be as adversely affected by an extended border search as
by a nonborder search. The fact that X has just crossed a border might
still be relevant in determining the existence of probable cause to
search him or his -vehicle since it would increase the probability that
contraband might be found, However, this effect would be vitiated to
the extent that (1) X had been searched at the border itself, (2) he had
not been kept under constant surveillance, or (3) time and distance
had elapsed. Similarly, if X has surrendered his vehicle to Y-as was
the case in Rodriguez-Gonzales4-the fact that the vehicle has recently
entered the country should not alone justify its search; the border
crossing is merely a factor contributing to probable cause,
IV. Conclusion
The border search exception to the fourth amendment should be re,
examined. Although border searches are differentiable as a class,
they are not internally homogeneous. The fact that an individual has
recently crossed a border does increase the probability that illicit ma-
terials will be found, but at least where intrusive and extended border
searches are concerned, the government should not be exempt from
normal requirements of probable cause.
and which a court should be reluctant to do absent a showing that these factors are
indeed not as important as Congress evidently believes.
34. Rodriguez-Gonzales v. United States, 378 F2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
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